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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1812 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
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RICHARD REEVEY, 
also known as Richard Reavey, 
Richard Reevey, 
Appellant 
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Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 3-08-527-1) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1834 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY WILLIAMS, 
a/k/a CHICK, 
Anthony Williams, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 3-08-445-2) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
_____________ 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 These consolidated appeals present the question of 
whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (“FSA”), may be applied 
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retroactively to authorize the District Court to impose a 
sentence below the prescribed mandatory minimum prison 
term in effect at the time the Appellants were sentenced.  We 
answer the question in the negative, and thus affirm the 
sentences imposed by the District Court. 
 
I. 
  
On December 7, 2009, Appellant Richard Reevey pled 
guilty to a charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 
841(b)(1)(B), and 846.  Section 841(b)(1)(B) of Title 21 
U.S.C. prescribes a mandatory minimum prison term of five 
years and a maximum prison term of forty years.
1
  Reevey 
stipulated in his plea agreement that his offense conduct, 
which occurred in March of 2007, included 10.8 grams of 
cocaine base.  On March 11, 2010, the District Court 
sentenced Reevey to the mandatory minimum term of five 
years.   
 
 On August 26, 2009, Appellant Anthony Williams 
entered a plea of guilty to a superseding Information charging 
him with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846.  Williams‟ 
criminal conduct took place between August of 2007 and 
January of 2008.  In his plea agreement, Williams stipulated 
that “the offense and relevant conduct involved between 5 
and 20 grams of cocaine base.”  (A. 42.)  Hence, Williams 
was also subject to the mandatory minimum prison term.  On 
March 11, 2010, Williams was sentenced to the five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence.  Responding to Williams‟ 
                                                          
1
 Section 846 of Title 21 U.S.C. provides that “[a]ny 
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense 
defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same 
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission 
of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”  Thus, 
a conspiracy to distribute the minimum quantity of crack 
cocaine triggering a mandatory prison term of at least five 
years carries with it the same sentence as the substantive drug 
trafficking crime delineated in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
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request for a downward departure based on the disparity in 
treatment between crack and powder cocaine offenders, the 
District Court, after noting that the “issue has been taken up 
by Congress,” declined to grant a downward departure.  (A. 
93.)   
 
 Both Reevey and Williams appealed their sentences, 
arguing that the District Court erred in refusing to impose a 
sentence below the statutory mandatory prison term of five 
years.
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a).   
 
II. 
 
 Ordinarily, district court sentences are reviewed under 
a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).  Where, however, the 
challenge to the sentence concerns the interpretation of a 
statute, we exercise plenary review.  See United States v. 
Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008).
3
   
 
Reevey argues on appeal that the District Court failed 
to adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when 
imposing the mandatory minimum sentence.  Williams claims 
on appeal that his sentence was unreasonable because the 
District Court did not recognize the “scientific and 
constitutional flaws” in the crack cocaine sentencing 
guidelines, and “[i]n the event that the [FSA is passed] during 
the pendency of this appeal, the sentence that was imposed 
will be an illegal sentence.”  (Williams‟ Br. at 18.)   
 
                                                          
2 We consolidated the appeals of Reevey, No. 10-1812, 
and Williams, No. 10-1834, by order dated August 30, 2010. 
3
 The government asserts that Reevey and Williams 
failed to preserve challenges to their sentences so that our 
review must be limited to plain error.  See United States v. 
Hawes, 523 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 2008).  Because we 
discern no error by the District Court, plain or otherwise, 
there is no need to determine whether Appellants‟ present 
arguments were sufficiently preserved in the District Court.   
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Appellants‟ arguments presuppose the existence of 
discretionary authority to impose a prison term of less than 
five years in these cases.  As the government notes, however, 
statutory mandatory minimum sentences are binding law and 
are to be enforced except in limited circumstances which are 
inapplicable here.   
 
Reevey‟s invocation of the § 3553(a) factors is 
foreclosed by United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289-90 
(3d Cir. 2004), where, in affirming the District Court‟s 
sentence, we held that “it is now clear that § 3553(a) did not 
give the district court the authority to sentence [appellant] 
below the statutorily mandated minimum sentence[.]”  
Indeed, “it is clear that Congress intended that mandatory 
minimum sentences are not to be affected by the general 
considerations of § 3553(a)(2) because that statute provides 
the authority for the district court to depart below the 
statutorily mandated minimum sentence.”  Id. at 289.  Under 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), upon a substantial assistance motion by 
the government, “the court shall have the authority to impose 
a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum 
sentence . . . .”  Additionally, under § 3553(f), a court “shall 
impose a sentence . . . without regard to any statutory 
minimum sentence” if the “safety valve” factors are satisfied.4  
                                                          
4
 The factors include: 
  
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 
criminal history point, as determined under the 
sentencing guidelines;  
(2) the defendant did not use violence or 
credible threats of violence or possess a firearm 
or other dangerous weapon (or induce another 
participant to do so) in connection with the 
offense;  
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious 
bodily injury to any person;  
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, 
as determined under the sentencing guidelines 
and was not engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the 
Controlled Substances Act; and  
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see Kellum, 356 F.3d at 289.  “These 
two narrow exceptions are the only authority a district court 
has to depart below a mandatory minimum sentence . . . .”  
Kellum, 356 F.3d at 289 (citing United States v. Santiago, 
201 F.3d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Villar, 184 
F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1999)).  It is undisputed that the 
government did not file substantial assistance motions in 
either case and neither Reevey nor Williams qualify for 
application of the § 3553(f) “safety valve.”  Therefore, the 
two narrow exceptions to imposing the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence are inapplicable. 
 
As we recognized in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 
237, 248 (3d Cir. 2006), unlike the advisory sentencing 
guidelines range, “the statutory minimum drug trafficking 
penalty in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) . . . is mandatory . . . .”  See 
also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 102-03 (2007) 
(“A person convicted of possession with intent to distribute 5 
grams or more of crack cocaine must be sentenced to a 
minimum of 5 years. . . .”) (emphasis added).  Thus, the 
District Court was obligated to impose five-year prison terms 
in these cases.   
  
III. 
 
On August 3, 2010, approximately four months after 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing 
hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to 
the Government all information and evidence 
the defendant has concerning the offense or 
offenses that were part of the same course of 
conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the 
fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful 
other information to provide or that the 
Government is already aware of the information 
shall not preclude a determination by the court 
that the defendant has complied with this 
requirement.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  In light of their prior convictions, 
neither Reevey nor Williams qualified for application of the 
safety valve.   
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Appellants were sentenced, the President signed the FSA into 
law.  Pertinent to these consolidated appeals, the FSA 
amended the minimum amount of crack cocaine necessary to 
trigger the five-year mandatory minimum prison term from 
five grams to twenty eight grams.  FSA § 2(a)(2).  Reevey‟s 
acknowledged distribution of 10.8 grams of crack and 
Williams‟ stipulation to responsibility for between five and 
twenty grams of cocaine base would not trigger the five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence under the FSA.  Reevey and 
Williams argue that the FSA should be applied to them. 
 
The government asserts that retroactive application of 
the FSA is precluded by the general “Savings Statute” found 
at 1 U.S.C. § 109.  The Savings Statute, in pertinent part, 
provides: 
 
The repeal of any statute shall not have the 
effect to release or extinguish any penalty, 
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such 
statute, unless the repealing Act shall so 
expressly provide, and such statute shall be 
treated as still remaining in force for the 
purpose of sustaining any proper action or 
prosecution for the enforcement of such 
penalty, forfeiture, or liability. 
 
1 U.S.C. § 109.  In effect, the Savings Statute mandates that a 
court apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was 
committed unless the new law expressly provides otherwise.  
Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 
661 (1974).  As the Court in Marrero observed, the Savings 
Statute “has been held to bar application of ameliorative 
criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force at 
the time of the commission of an offense.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Moreover, the Savings Statute is applicable to 
statutory amendments.  United States v. Jacobs, 919 F.2d 10, 
12-13 (3d Cir. 1990).  In Jacobs, we held that the District 
Court could not apply a statutory amendment in effect at the 
time of the defendant‟s sentencing that made her eligible for 
probation because the statute in effect at the time of the 
commission of her crime precluded eligibility for probation 
and Congress had not expressed an intention to give 
retroactive effect to the statutory change.  Id. at 13.  It has 
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also been held that courts must apply the statutory law in 
effect at the time of the commission of the offense even 
where a statute is repealed while the case is on appeal.  See 
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 
385, 434-35 (1972).  Consequently, we have recognized that: 
 
it is possible that sometime in the future two 
defendants may receive different penalties for 
having committed essentially the same 
crimes—although at different times.  Such a 
result may be considered anomalous, but it is 
Congress that has drawn the line.  If penalties 
are to differ because of an arbitrarily selected 
date, it seems fairer that the severity of the 
penalty depend upon the voluntary act of a 
defendant in choosing the date of his criminal 
conduct than upon the date of sentencing, which 
could vary with the fortuities of criminal 
proceedings.  
 
United States v. Caldwell, 463 F.2d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(citation omitted); see also Marrero, 417 U.S. at 664 
(explaining that defendant‟s argument for leniency was 
“addressed to the wrong governmental branch.  Punishment 
for federal crimes is a matter for Congress, subject to judicial 
veto only when the legislative judgment oversteps 
constitutional bounds.”).   
      
The general Savings Statute requires that any intent to 
“release or extinguish any penalty” under an existing statute 
be “expressly provide[d]” in the subsequent congressional 
enactment.  The FSA does not contain an express statement 
that the increase in the amount of crack cocaine triggering the 
five-year mandatory minimum is to be applied to crimes 
committed before the FSA‟s effective date.  Nor does it 
provide that those sentenced before the FSA‟s effective date 
are to be re-sentenced.  Therefore, the FSA cannot be applied 
to Reevey and Williams.   
 
Our conclusion is consistent with the decision of every 
Court of Appeals to have addressed this issue.  See United 
States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010) (FSA 
“is not . . . retroactive and thus does not apply to this case”); 
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United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 (8th Cir. 
2010) (“[T]he Fair Sentencing Act contains no express 
statement that it is retroactive, and thus the „general savings 
statute,‟ 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in 
place at the time the crime was committed.”); United States v. 
Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Like our sister 
circuits that have considered this issue, [] we conclude that 
the savings statute operates to bar the retroactive application 
of the FSA.”); United States v. Gomes, 621 F.3d 1343, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841 “because the FSA 
took effect in August 2010, after appellant committed his 
crimes, [and] 1 U.S.C. § 109 bars the Act from affecting his 
punishment”); United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 
(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming sixty-month mandatory minimum 
sentence because the FSA “contains no express statement that 
it is retroactive nor can we infer any such express intent from 
its plain language”).  We find this consistent line of authority 
to be compelling.
5
 
 
IV. 
 
                                                          
5
 The Appellants‟ reliance on United States v. Douglas, 
--- F. Supp. 2d ---, Crim. No. 09-202, 2010 WL 4260221 (D. 
Me. Oct. 27, 2010), is misplaced and unpersuasive.  In 
Douglas, the court held that the FSA retroactively applied to a 
defendant who had yet to be “sentenced, but who engaged in 
crack cocaine trafficking and pleaded guilty under the 
previous harsher regime.”  Id. at *1.  Douglas is easily 
distinguishable from the present appeals.  Here, both Reevey 
and Williams committed their crimes and were sentenced 
before the FSA was signed into law.  As the authoring Judge 
of Douglas acknowledged in another opinion issued that same 
day, the FSA does not apply to those who, like Reevey and 
Williams, have already been sentenced.  United States v. 
Butterworth, Crim. No. 06-62, 2010 WL 4362859, at *1 (D. 
Me. Oct. 27, 2010) (“Thus, this case is unlike United States v. 
Douglas, Case No. 09-202 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2010), where 
today I . . . ruled that for sentences going forward the 
provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act do apply, even if the 
criminal conduct occurred before its enactment . . . .”). 
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In conclusion, Appellants‟ crimes are governed by the 
five-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence that was in 
effect at the time the crimes were committed.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).  Accordingly, the sentences 
imposed by the District Court will be affirmed. 
